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RECOVERY FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF
A VIABLE FETUS:
Werling v. Sandy
INTRODUCTION
In Werling v. Sandy,' the Ohio Supreme Court held a viable2 fetus,
negligently injured "en ventre sa mere"3 and subsequently stillborn, may be the
basis for a wrongful death action4 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01.1 The
court's ruling represented Ohio's explicit acceptance of the trend allowing a
wrongful death action for the death of a fetus.' Although Werling was not a
'17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985).
'Viability has been defined as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be con-
tinued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." P. RAMSEY. ETHIcs AT
THE EDGES OF LIFE 6-8 (1978). A viable fetus is an unborn child which had developed in its mother's womb.
BLACKS LAW DiCrIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973), the Court stated
that viability is "usually placed at about seven months (twenty-eight weeks) but may occur earlier, even at
twenty-four weeks."
' "En ventre sa mere" is a term that describes an unborn child as "in its mother's womb." BLACKs LAW DIC-
TIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979).
'Wrongful death refers to the death of a fetus which occurs due to the negligence of a third party. A
wrongful death action is a lawsuit brought on behalf of a deceased person's beneficiaries that alleges death
was caused by the negligence of another. The statutory beneficiaries have an original and distinct claim for
damages which is not derivative of a claim existing in the decedent. Comment, Torts-The Right of Recovery
for the Tortious Death of the Unborn, 27 How. L.J. 1649, 1649-50 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Comment,
Torts-The Right to Recovery).
'OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page Supp. 1984) provides, in pertinent part:
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who
would have been liable if death had not ensued, or the administrator or executor of the estate of such
person, as such administrator or executor, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances which make
it aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter...
'The following cases support the view that a wrongful death action is maintainable for the death of an un-
born child: Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (involving viable fetus: applying
District of Columbia law); Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964) (involving a viable fe-
tus; applying South Carolina law); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974) (involv-
ing eight and one half month old fetus); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966)
(seven to eight month old viable fetus); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962) (cause
of action granted in case involving a viable fetus that died two weeks before delivery date); Worgan v. Greg-
go & Ferrar, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956) (viable fetus); Shirley v. Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267
S.E.2d 809 (1980); Porter v. Lassister, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) (the court allowed a cause of
action for wrongful death in a case involving a "quick child," even if nonviable); Green v. Smith, 71 111. 2d
501, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 111. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976) (viable
fetus); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (involving thirty-six week old vi-
able fetus); Maniates v. Grant Hosp., 15 Ill. App. 3d 903, 305 N.E.2d 422 (1973) (cause of action granted to
survivors of viable fetus that died in the last week of pregnancy); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277
N.E.2d 20 (1971) (this case involved a full-term child); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d I (1962) (via-
ble fetus); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970) (viable fetus); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.
1955) (full-term viable fetus); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 198 1); Diefenderfer v. Lousiana Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 383 So. 2d 1032, cert. granted. 384 So. 2d 985 (La. App. 1980); Valence v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 195 1); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923); State ex
rel Oldham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964) (nine-month old viable fetus); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975) (eight and one-half month old fetus); O'Neill v. Morse,
385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971) (eight month old fetus); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222
N.W.2d 334 (1974) (viable fetus); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (the court in
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case of first impression in Ohio,7 it presented the Ohio Supreme Court with the
first opportunity to expand the legal rights of the unborn.
FACTS
Lucinda T. Werling became pregnant during the summer of 1980 and
received prenatal obstetrical care.' Due to her obesity the treating physicians
determined Ms. Werling was an increased labor risk.
On April 30, 198 1, Lucinda Werling was admitted to the hospital. A fetal
monitor was used to evaluate the heart of the nine-to-ten-month-old fetus.
Before delivery, the fetus was alive and viable."
However, the attending physician left the hospital before the delivery of
Lucinda Werling's baby. The hospital nursing staff monitored Ms. Werling.
Suddenly, the fetal monitor indicated the fetus' heart was not functioning.
After a delay, the only available surgeon ordered Ms. Werling be prepared for
surgery. The surgeon delivered a stillborn fetus."0
Lucinda Werling filed a wrongful death complaint pursuant to Ohio Rev.
Code § 2125.01." The complaint alleged that due to the negligence of the two
treating physician-obstetricians and the hospital in which the delivery oc-
curred, her fetus was delivered stillborn."
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled a cause of action does
not exist for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. 3 Despite a conflict with the
Verkennes was the first to allow a wrongful death recovery for the death of a viable but stillborn fetus);
Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969) (in-
volving an eight month old fetus); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St.
Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431,
167 N.E.2d 106 (1959) (this case marked the first ruling by an Ohio court on the issue of whether a viable fe-
tus has a cause of action for wrongful death when that fetus is delivered stillborn. The court of appeals held
that a cause of action does exist, however, both parties agreed to dismiss the motion to certify the record to
the Ohio Supreme Court. Therefore, Werling v. Sandy was the first opportunity for the Ohio Supreme Court
to rule on the issue.); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976) (viable fetus); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,
268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (the court
held that the decedent was a person within the meaning of the wrongful death statute regardless of viability);
Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975);
Villancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d
597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967) (involving a viable fetus).
7In Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), the Madison County Court of Appeals
held that "a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of a viable unborn child which is subsequently
stillborn." However, both parties agreed to dismiss a motion to certify the record to the Ohio Supreme
Court. Id.
117 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 476 N.E.2d at 1053.
ld. All parties agreed that the nine-to-ten month-old fetus was alive and viable just before delivery.
'Old.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
1i7 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 476 N.E.2d at 1053.
317 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 476 N.E.2d at 1053.
[Vol. 19: I
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holding of Stidam v. Ashmore,' the Court of Appeals for Allen County af-
firmed the trial court's decision." However, the court of appeals certified the
record of the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for review and final determina-
tion.
To resolve the certified issue," whether an action for wrongful death ex-
ists 7 where the decedent was a stillborn fetus, the Ohio Supreme Court had to
determine whether an unborn fetus which dies "en ventre sa mere"'" is a "per-
son" within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01.19 Relying on the pur-
pose of the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute20 and Ohio case law2' interpreting the
rights of the unborn, the Werling court ruled that an unborn fetus is a
"person" under Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01.22
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
In Werling, the Ohio Supreme Court first analyzed the history and the
purpose of a wrongful death cause of action to determine whether such a cause
of action exists for the survivors of a viable fetus subsequently delivered
stillborn.23 A cause of action for wrongful death did not exist at common law.2
In 1851, the Ohio Legislature enacted the first wrongful death statute which
has remained almost unchanged and is now known as Ohio Rev Code §
2125.01.2S The wrongful death statute" is the only civil remedy available to
"4109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959). In Stidam, the Madison County Court of Appeals held that a
cause of action exists for the wrongful death of a viable fetus which is subsequently stillborn. Id. In contrast,
in Werling, the Allen County Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision that ruled a cause of action
does not exist for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. 17 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 476 N.E.2d at 1053-54.
1"17 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 476 N.E.2d at 1053-54.
"Id. at 46, 476 N.E.2d at 1054.
"OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
"See supra note 3.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
Mld. The purpose of the wrongful death statute is to provide a remedy whenever there would have been an
action in damages had death not ensued. 17 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1054.
"Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950) (recognizing wrongful death cause of action for
viable fetus injured "en ventre so mere" yet born alive and who died three months later); Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) (allowing recovery for viable fetus injured "'en
ventre sa mere'); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959) (allowing cause of action
for the wrongful death of a viable unborn child subsequently stillborn).
"2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
17 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 476 N.E.2d at 1054.
"Id. See generally J. MCCORMAC, WRONGFUL DEATH IN OHIO 1-6 (1982); Traci, Law and Logic: Conflict in
Ohio's Wrongful Death Statute, 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 38, 38-40 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Traci, Law and
Logic); Parness and Pritchard, To Be Or Not To Be: Protecting the Unborn s Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN.
L. REV. 257, 272-275 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Parness, To Be Or Not To Be); Comment, Torts-The Right
of Recovery, supra note 4, at 1656.
"The latest amendments effective Feb. 5, 1982 expanded the type of compensatory damages recoverable for
a wrongful death action. J. MCCORMAC. WRONGFUL DEATH IN OHIO, 1-6 (1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
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compensate the decedent's surviving beneficiaries.27
In Werling, the Ohio Supreme Court characterized the wrongful death
statute as remedial in nature, in that it was designed to alleviate the inequity of
the common law rule which denied this cause of action. 8 By characterizing the
wrongful death statute as remedial in nature, the Werling court could liberally
construe the statute to promote justice and social policy. 9
In Werling, the court determined the purpose of the statute30 was to "pro-
vide a remedy whenever there would have been an action in damages had
death not ensued. ' 31 The Ohio Supreme Court also implied that the statute was
intended to insure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their acts and to
deter harmful conduct. This implication was set forth when the court noted "it
is logically indefensible as well as unjust to deny an action where the child is
stillborn, and yet permit the action where the child survives birth but only for a
short period of time."32
Since the court realized that the denial of a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a viable fetus allows a tortfeasor responsible for the death of
a fetus to escape liability while a tortfeasor who only injures a fetus is held
liable," the Werling court determined that an action for the wrongful death of
a viable fetus is consistent with the clear purpose of the wrongful death statute
and furthers the remedial nature of the statute.3 The court in Werling noted,
To hold otherwise would only serve to reward the tortfeasor by allowing
2717 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 476 N.E.2d at 1054. See Keaton v. Ribbeck, 58 Ohio St. 2d 443, 391 N.E.2d 307
(1979) (the Ohio Supreme Court specifically ruled that there is no common-law action for wrongful death);
Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946) (recognizing that the wrongful death statute in Ohio is
an innovation of the principles of common law and affords the only civil remedy to compensate others for
death resulting from injuries).
1117 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1054.
"See Comment, Tort-The Right of Recovery, supra note 4, at 1658, indicating that a wrongful death statute
is designed to remedy the inequity of the common law. As a remedy, a wrongful death statute should be
liberally construed to cover the wrongful death of an unborn child because the legislature generally
recognizes and protects the rights of the unborn in other legislation. Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 488,
277 N.E.2d 20, 21 (1971). However, other courts construe the wrongful death statute as being in derogation
of the common law and strictly construe the statute. See Comment, Torts-The Right of Recovery, supra
note 4. In denying the right to maintain a wrongful death action for the death of an unborn child, some
courts contend that the statute is intended to cover only the death of a person who has been alive and the
fact that the legislature did not specifically include an unborn child implies the statute does not apply to an
unborn child. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 237, 319 S.W.2d 221, 223 (1958).
10 17 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1054.
3 I1d.
3217 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055. See Note, Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus in
Missouri. 52 UMKC L. REV. 692, 700.01 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Note, Recovery for Wrongful Death).
The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the wrongful death statute is designed to provide compensa-
tion to a limited class of plaintiffs for the loss of the "companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel
... and support of one who would have been alive but for the defendant's wrong." Id. at 701.
3Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949). The Ohio Supreme Court
held that a viable child injured while "en ventre sa mere" has a cause of action. Id.
1'17 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
[Vol. 19: !
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him to escape liability upon an increase in the severity of the harm, if such
harm results in death to the child. In other words, the greater the harm in-
flicted, the better the opportunity that a defendant will be exonerated.
This result is clearly not acceptable under the statute."
In holding that a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus, the Werling court intended to fulfill the purpose of the statute and justly
compensate parents for the loss of parenthood.' The Werling court reached
this decision by noting that the action for wrongful death is for the exclusive
benefit of statutory beneficiaries" and in the instant case, it is the parents who
suffer mental distress and loss of society due to the death of the fetus. 8
The Werling court also answered the issue of whether a viable fetus is a
person within the meaning of the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute by recognizing
that the rights of the unborn child were protected in other areas of Ohio law.39
Unborn children have been recognized as acquiring inheritance rights in Ohio
Rev. Code § 2105.14.4 The Ohio Statute Against Perpetuities" has been inter-
preted to include a child in gestation who is subsequently born alive as a life in
being throughout gestation.42 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 3 includes in
its definition of decedent a stillborn fetus." In addition, the Uniform Parentage
Act 5 allows the personal representative of an unborn child to bring an action
on behalf of the infant to establish a father-child relationship."
"Id. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 349, 360 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Note, The Law and the Unborn Child).
'617 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1054.
37Id.
mId. The Werling court noted that its decision was directed to compensate parents for the loss of parenthood.
Id. Loss of society refers to a broad range of mutual benefits that each family member receives from the
others continued existence including love, affection, care, attention, companionship and comfort. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (5th ed. 1979). The Werling court did not discuss damages. Therefore, for the pur-
poses of this casenote, it is not necessary to further analyze the damages recoverable in a wrongful death ac-
tion.
"17 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1054-55. See generally Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, supra
note 35, at 351-354; Parness, To Be Or Not To Be, supra note 24, at 263-72 (examines six areas of law affect-
ing the unborn: inheritance, trusts, crime, torts, birth law and custody); Hartye, Tort Recovery for the Un-
born Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 276, 285 (1976-1977) (hereinafter cited as Hartye, Tort Recovery).
4'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.14 (Page 1976) provides:
Descendants of an intestate begotten before his death, but born thereafter, in all cases will inherit as if
born in the lifetime of the intestate and surviving him; but in no other case can a person inherit unless
living at the time of the death of the intestate.
11OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (Page 1976) provides:
No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after a life or lives in being at the creation of the interest...
4217 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1055 (citing Phillips v. Herron, 55 Ohio St. 478,478, 45 N.E. 720,720
(1896)).
"OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.01(B) (Page 1976).
"Id. The statute provides: (B) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes a stillborn infant or
fetus.
4'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.04 (Page 1976).
,*State v. Van Dorn, 56 Ohio App. 82, 83, 10 N.E.2d 14, 15 (1937). The Court of Appeals of Crawford
Summer, 19851 RECENT CASES
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The fact that the Ohio Legislature has enacted legislation, other than the
wrongful death statute, that expressly recognizes and protects certain rights of
an unborn child indicates a desire on the part of the legislature to provide pro-
tection for unborn children."' This supports the conclusion of the Werling
court that the wrongful death statute should apply to the unborn child.'8
CASE LAW ANALYSIS
Although a wrongful death action is entirely statutory,' 9 the Werling
court reviewed two previous Ohio Supreme Court decisions concerning the
rights of the unborn to determine whether a fetus is a "person" within the
meaning of the wrongful death statute.5" The previous decisions concerned the
rights of an unborn child in cause of action for prenatal injury and for the
wrongful death of a child born alive but subsequently dying as a result of
prenatal injuries.5' The Werling court noted that a review of these analogous
decisions would assist the court in the resolution of the issue presented in the
instant case.1
2
In Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 53 the Ohio Supreme Court was
presented with the issue of whether a cause of action existed in Ohio for a liv-
ing child injured while "en ventre sa mere. -,4 The Williams court noted that in
the absence of a statute the general rule with respect to the rights of the un-
born child is that a prenatal injury affords no basis for an action in damages.5
This general rule resulted from many years of precedent withholding
recovery. 6 The rationale in support of denying recovery for prenatal injury in-
cluded a lack of precedent, the theory that an unborn child is a part of its
County held that a right of action exists under the statute irrespective of whether the child is stillborn or
born alive.
"Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 488,277 N.E.2d 20,21 (1971); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 131, 188
N.W.2d 785, 786 (197 1). For a discussion of state laws and state policies involving the unborn see Parness,
To Be Or Not To Be, supra note 24, at 263.
"Parness, To Be or Not to Be, supra note 24, at 263.
41See generally J. MCCORMAC, WRONGFUL DEATH IN OHIO 1-6 (1982); Traci, Law and Logic, supra note 24,
at 39; Parness, To Be Or Not To Be, supra note 24, at 272.
"017 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1055. See Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950);
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); see generally Peterson v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197 N.E.2d 194 (1964) (the court held that an unborn viable
child capable of life outside its mother's womb was a "person" within family compensation clause of
automobile liability policy).
"'Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152
Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
3217 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
11152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
"Id. at 116, 87 N.E.2d at 334.
"Id. See generally Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts. Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Death and Wrongful Birth: Time For A New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 678-86 (1984)
(hereinafter cited as Collins, An Overview).
m152 Ohio St. at 118-119, 87 N.E.2d at 336.
[Vol. i 9: I
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mother until birth and therefore has no judicial existence and the belief that
such a cause of action would allow fraudulent claims.57
However, the Williams court held that the viable fetus was entitled to be
heard as a "person" within the Ohio Constitution Article I, Section 16.58 Ap-
parently, the Williams court rejected the rationale expressed by previous
courts that denied recovery for prenatal injuries. 9 As a result, a viable fetus,
injured while "en ventre sa mere," could institute a cause of action for
damagesY° Specifically, the syllabus of Williams, presents the proposition that:
Injuries wrongfully inflicted upon an unborn viable child capable of ex-
isting independently of the mother are injuries "done him in his ... per-
son" within the meaning of Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution and,
subsequent to his birth, he may maintain an action to recover damages for
the injury so inflicted.6'
The opinion in Williams marked Ohio's acceptance of the trend to allow
recovery to a surviving child for prenatal injuries.62 Presently, all United States
jurisdictions allow a cause of action for prenatal injuries.63 The court in Wer-
ling reviewed the holding of Williams to find support for an expansion of the
rights of an unborn fetus in the area of tort law." Consequently, the Werling
court cited part of Judge Matthias' opinion in Williams to emphasize the
refusal of the Ohio Supreme Court to sustain the traditional view that the in-
fant is a part of the mother until birth and has no existence in law until birth.65
"Comment, The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action to an Unborn Viable Fetus Under the Penn-
sylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 1017, 1018-1019 (1983) (hereinafter cited as
Comment, The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action). Courts denying recovery for the wrongful death
of a viable fetus offer a similar rationale including the belief that proof of such a claim would be speculative
and that the action should be created by the legislature instead of being recognized by the courts. Id. See
generally Goichman and Hirsh, The Expanding Rights of the Fetus: An Evolution Not a Revolution, 30
MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 212, 213 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Goichman, The Expanding Rights).
"OHIo CONST. art. 1 16. This section provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without
denial and delay.
"For a discussion of the rationale in favor of recovery for prenatal injuries see Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra
note 39, at 278-280.
11152 Ohio St. at 114, 87 N.E.2d at 334.
6d.
"See Note, Recovery for Wrongful Death, supra note 32, at 696.
"See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1230 (1971) for a collection of state cases recognizing a cause of action for
prenatal injuries.
"17 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
"Id. Specifically, Judge Matthias, writing for a unanimous court in Williams stated:
To hold that the plaintiff (child) in the instant case did not suffer an injury in her person would require
this court to announce that as a matter of law the infant is a part of the mother until birth and has no
existence in law until that time. In our view such a ruling would deprive the infant of the right con-
ferred by the Constitution upon all persons, by the application of a time-worn fiction not founded on
fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjustified. 152 Ohio St. at 128-129, 87 N.E.2d at
340.
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After determining that Ohio clearly recognizes a cause of action for the
prenatal injuries of a living child, the Werling court noted that the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Jasinsky v. Potts" recognized the validity of a wrongful death
action on behalf of a child who was born alive but died three months later due
to prenatal injuries.67 The court's opinion in Jasinsky was logically based on the
principle established in Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.," that an un-
born child was a "person" within Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion.69
Relying on the Ohio Supreme Court decisions in Williams0 and Jasinsky7"
the court in Werling established a foundation for their ultimate holding that a
cause of action exists under the wrongful death statute for a viable fetus
delivered stillborn." The Werling court reasoned that since a viable featus is
considered a separate legal entity for purposes of a prenatal injury suit as in
Williams73 then it follows that when a viable fetus is delivered stillborn a cause
of action is warranted. ' In addition, the Werling court noted it is illogical and
unjust to permit an action where the child survives birth but only for a short
time as in Jasinsky,7" yet deny recovery where the child is stillborn.76
According to the court in Werling, this illogical requirement of live birth
is an artificial demarcation which the court expressly rejected as a requirement
for a wrongful death suit." Although the Ohio Supreme Court did not render
the decision in Stidam v. Ashmore, 78 the Werling court noted the absurdity of
the requirement of birth in Stidam as illustrated by the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the
same prenatal injury of which one died before and the other after birth.
Shall there be a cause of action for the death of one and not for the other?
Surely logic requires recognition of causes of action for the deaths of both,
or for neither.79
6153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950). For an expanded discussion of Jasinsky see Note, Death,
Damages, Application of Wrongful Death Statute to Death from Pre-Natal Injury, 19 U. CIN. L. REv. 526
(1950) (hereinafter cited as Note, Death, Damages).
"117 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055; 153 Ohio St. at 529, 92 N.E.2d at 809.
"152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
'See Note, Death, Damages, supra note 66, at 526.
0 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
11153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
n17 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
"1152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
'417 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
"1153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
7617 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
"Id. See Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
"109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959). For more expanded discussion of Stidan see Note, Cause of
Action for Wrongful Death of Viable Fetus, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 677 (1960).
'917 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055. Stldam, 109 Ohio App. at 434, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
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In Stidam," the court of appeals stated that Ohio's wrongful death
statute," grants a derivative right. 2 To determine whether that right exists for
a particular claimant, the court must establish that the injury would have en-
titled the injured party to maintain an action if death had not ensued.'3 With
respect to a viable fetus, the Stidam court determined that had death not en-
sued the child would have been entitled to maintain an action.' The Ohio
Supreme Court in Werling accepted this rationale of Stidam and concluded
that logic requires that a viable fetus which is negligently injured "en ventre sa
mere" and subsequently stillborn can be the basis of a wrongful death action. 5
As previously discussed, the Werling court based its decision on Ohio stat-
utes" and case law87 that indicated the unborn fetus had legal rights in the area
of tort law.88 However, a review of Ohio criminal law indicated a viable fetus
was not a "person" within the meaning of Ohio's former vehicular homicide
statute. 9 The Werling court distinguished this holding by recognizing the
definition of a word in a criminal statute does not necessarily have the same
meaning in a civil statute." Therefore, the Werling court rules the criminal law
interpretation of "person" was not controlling in the instant case.9'
Following its review of applicable Ohio statutes and case law, the court in
Werling compared its acceptance of the viability standard as a basis for a
wrongful death action with other United States jurisdictions." Approximately
thirty states allow recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.9 Those
courts recognize the biological independence of a viable fetus and reject the
1*109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
11109 Ohio App. at 434, 167 N.E.2d at 108. See Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra note 39, at 295 for a discus-
sion of Stidam. The Stidam court stated that prior prenatal injury cases in Ohio, requiring live birth, were
not proper precedent as those courts were not presented with the precise issue of live birth as a requirement.
Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra note 39, at 295.
"109 Ohio App. at 434, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
4Id.
8517 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055. See Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra note 39, at 295 and Comment,
The Necessity of Granting a Cause of Action, supra note 57, at 1019.
"See supra notes 40-43.
"See supra note 50.
"17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985).
0 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.181 (Page 1976). See State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599
(1971).
"17 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 476 N.E.2d at 1056. See Comment, The Expanding Rights, supra note 57, at 227.
'17 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 476 N.E.2d at 1056.
921d.
"See supra note 6. The first American case allowing recovery for prenatal injury in the death of a child
before its birth was Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). See Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d
411, 422 (1978) for a collection of cases recognizing a cause of action for a viable fetus. See generally, Note,
Recovery for Wrongful Death, supra note 32, at 697; Comment, Torts- The Right of Recovery. supra note 4,
at 1650; and Collins, An Overview, supra note 55, at 710.
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live-birth requirement.94 Only nine states deny recovery for the wrongful death
of a viable fetus.95
Several states base recovery on a standard other than viability. The Rhode
Island, Alabama and Louisiana courts adopted the causation test.96 That test
permits conditional recovery for an injury sustained by a child at any time
before birth; the prerequisite being that the injury was the proximate result of
a wrongful act.97 Indiana requires that a child be full-term for a cause of action
to exist.98 Georgia allows recovery provided the fetus is quick," even if non-
viable. In addition, although not adopted by any jurisdiction, some commen-
tators advocate the standard of the fetus' cerebral development.",
ANALYSIS OF THE WERLING STANDARD
In Werling, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly adopted the viability stan-
dard as a requirement for a wrongful death action on behalf of an unborn
child. 01 As a result, Ohio joined the majority by adopting the viability stan-
dard.10 2 However, the Werling court and several commentators 3 have noted
the presence of problems associated with the use of the viability standard."
For example, the term "viable" is elusive because not all fetuses attain this
stage in development at the same point in gestation.103 Also, the concept of
viability is difficult to apply due to the sophistication of medical science that
allows a child to be conceived outside the womb. 6
See Note, Recovery for Wrongful Death, supra note 32, at 697.
9 Courts that deny recovery base their decision on the argument that a fetus is not a person within the mean-
ing of the statute and recovery would be too speculative to award pecuniary damages. See Kilmer v. Hicks,
22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974), overruled, 144 Ariz. 479, 698 P.2d 726 (1985); Justus v. Atchison,
19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d
425 (1966); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
"Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019 (La.
Ct. App. 1980); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976). See Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579, 590 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff; Goichman,
The Expanding Rights, supra note 57, at 217; Collins, An Overview, supra note 55, at 689.
"Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, supra note 96, at 590-91.
"Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971).
""Quick" child is one that has developed so that it moves within the mother's womb. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1122 (5th ed. 1979).
1
"Milby, The New Biology and the Question of Personhood: Implications for Abortion, 9 AM. J. LAW &
MED. 31, 41 (1983).
.. 17 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1055.
U21d. See supra note 6.
"'See generally Note, Recovery for Wrongful Death, supra note 32, at 692 and Comment, Torts-The Right
of Recovery. supra note 4, at 1649.
"1'17 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 1056.
1051d.
"Id. See generally Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1961-62) (hereinafter cited as Note, The Impact).
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RECENT CASES
In Roe v. Wade, 10' the United States Supreme Court stated that viability is
"usually placed at about seven months (twenty-eight weeks) but may occur ear-
lier, even as early as twenty-four weeks.' This definition illustrates the inac-
curacy of the viability standard. If anything, the viability standard appears to
be another form of "artificial demarcation" to enable courts to decide when to
grant recovery to an unborn child.' 9 It is apparent that as medical science
changes, the point of viability will also change.I" Justice Douglas shared those
concerns in Werling.I" He concurred with the holding of the majority to allow
a cause of action but he stressed the importance of a precise definition of
viability."' Specifically, Justice Douglas expressed concern that the "open-
endedness" of the Werling decision would encourage multifarious actions in-
stituted to determine when the Ohio Supreme Court believes viability begins."3
In addition, in his separate concurrence, Justice Douglas warned that the
Werling decision and its relationship to Roe would present difficult questions
in the future.""
In light of modern medicine, the viability standard of Werling indicates
that such a standard is illogical and unjust. Medical advancements have led to
the conclusion that the crucial period of intrauterine development is during the
first trimester, a period before viability."5 During the first trimester the fetus is
most susceptible to environmental influences and to injury."6 Medical
authorities indicate that congenital defects caused by environmental factors
can be sustained only in the earliest stages of the previable period."' Therefore,
a viability limitation would deny recovery to a nonviable fetus which may
possibly be a denial of the most meritorious claims."'
The adoption of the causation test would alleviate this injustice. That test
107410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Supreme Court held that the unborn child was not a person within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment). See Comment, Torts-The Right of Recovery, supra note 4, at 1661-62.
10410 U.S. at 160.
' 
0 See Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra note 39, at 282.
'101d.
" 17 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 476 N.E.2d at 1057. Justice Douglas concurred with the majority in a separate opin-
ion.
11117 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 476 N.E.2d at 1057.
113Id.
1II'd.
"'See Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff supra note 96, at 589. For example, medical knowledge has empha-
sized that the fetus is most susceptible to environmental influences during the first trimester. Id. The effects
of radiation, infectious disease, and nutrition all indicate that healthy fetal development may depend on fac-
tors existing at the time of or before conception. Id.
"l6Id.
"'Id See Note, The Impact, supra note 106, at 563 discussing medical authorities that indicate congenital
defects caused by environmental factors can be sustained only within the earliest stages of the previable
period.
"ld.
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assumes the fetus is a separate person."9 Due to modern medical science,
biological separability begins at conception and not at viability therefore legal
separability should begin at conception.'20 Under the causation theory, the test
is whether the damage sustained is the proximate result of a wrongful act.'
Because the Werling court refused to designate as a "person" a fetus in-
capable of independently surviving a pre-mature birth it failed to adopt the
causation test.' Also, the Werling court believed the adoption of the viability
standard made the decision in Werling consistent with Roe v. Wade. "I In Roe,
the United States Supreme Court held that a fetus was not a "person" under
the fourteenth amendment."' According to Roe, since the fetus has the
capability of maintaining life outside the mother's womb at the point of viabili-
ty, a state has a legitimate interest to protect potential life.'25
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade has been misin-
terpreted in many cases concerning the recognition of an unborn fetus as a per-
son.' 26 Although the Court in Roe held that a fetus was not a person under the
fourteenth amendment, that Court noted, in dicta, that the decision did not
preclude state action in protecting the unborn in other areas, such as wrongful
death, where the state may have an interest.'27 Therefore, the concern that the
adoption of the causation test would be in conflict with Roe v. Wade is unwar-
ranted.
Both the viability standard and the live-birth requirement are artificial
demarcations to determine the point at which the unborn fetus is entitled to
legal protection in tort law.' As a result, both standards result in an injustice
to a nonviable fetus who is negligently injured while "en ventre sa mere. " A
nonviable fetus would probably have survived had it not been for a tortfeasor's
wrongful act, for as long as a fetus is alive in the uterus it is capable of entering
"'For a discussion of the rationale expressed to dispose of the viability standard and to adopt the causation
standard see Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra note 39, at 281.
'See Hartye, Tort Recovery, supra note 39, at 282 advocating the theory that biological separability clearly
begins at conception and not viability.
11d. See Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, Is RUTGERS L. REV. 61, 71
(1960).
117 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 476 N.E.2d at 1056.
"1id. The Werling court stated that their decision was "entirely consistent with Roe to the effect that a
viable fetus is a person entitled to protection and may be a basis for recovery under the wrongful death
statute." Id.
11417 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 476 N.E.2d at 1056 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
111410 U.S. at 163.
"'See Comment, Torts-The Right of Recovery, supra note 4, at 1649. "An extension of Roe into the area of
tort recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus denies the fetus the status of a "person" within the meaning of
state wrongful death statutes and essentially grants a tortfeasor immunity from liability for his wrongful
act." Id. at 1675.
"'See Comment, Torts-The Right of Recovery, supra note 4, at 1674.
"Id. at 1682.
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the viability stage.'" The refusal of the Ohio Supreme Court to adopt the
causation test in a wrongful death action will lead to results similar to those oc-
curring in prenatal recovery before the rejection of the live-birth
requirement.'" The illogical and unjust result will be the extension of liability
to one who merely injures a fetus yet no liability imposed on a tortfeasor
whose misconduct caused the death of a fetus."' The logic of the rationale in
Werling should have been extended to include the nonviable fetus. A fetus
should be recognized as a "person" within the meaning of the Ohio Wrongful
Death Statute"2 from the point of conception, not viability.
CONCLUSION
The case of Werling v. Sandy serves to expand tort recovery for the un-
born child in a direction consistent with the majority of United States jurisdic-
tions. Werling allows recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus which is
negligently injured "en ventre sa mere" and subsequently stillborn. The Ohio
Supreme Court's holding that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning
of the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute was based on an analysis of the purpose of
the statute and other pertinent Ohio statutes and case law interpreting the
rights of the unborn child.
The Werling court determined the purpose of the statute was to provide a
remedy where there would have been an action for damages had death not en-
sued. The court in Werling fulfilled this purpose by allowing parents to in-
stitute an action for the wrongful death of their viable fetus. In addition, the
Werling court found support for its holding in previous Ohio case law allowing
a cause of action for prenatal injuries and for the wrongful death of a child that
survives birth yet dies shortly thereafter. These decisions served as a founda-
tion for the court to make the next logical step in determining the rights of the
unborn child, namely, allowing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus subsequently delivered stillborn.
The Werling court specifically adopted the viability standard to determine
the point at which the unborn fetus is entitled to protection in tort law. The
Werling court refused to recognize a nonviable fetus as a person within the
meaning of the wrongful death statute. In the future, the rationale used to ex-
tend recovery to the viable fetus should be considered with respect to the non-
viable fetus to ensure legal protection whenever a wrongful act has been com-
mitted.
JANET I. STICH
1111d. at 1679 noting that a fetus that is alive in the uterus is connected to maternal circulation and is capable
of being brought to the point of viability, no matter what its age.
"111d Those results include a penalty imposed against a tortfeasor who injures a fetus yet no penalty against
a tortfeasor who causes the death of a fetus. Id.
131id
"'OHlo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page Supp. 1984).
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